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Introduction
Emissions from motor vehicles continue to present a daunting challenge to policy practitioners. An efficient emissions tax would be infeasible, either economically because measurement of such emissions would be inaccurate and expensive (Fullerton and West, 2002; Fullerton and Gan, 2005) , or politically because monitoring of such emissions would likely intrude drivers' privacy. The existing literature (Fullerton and West, 2002; Innes, 1996) suggests that at least in theory, some optimal combinations of car and gasoline taxes can induce the first-best outcome by correctly accounting for the negative externality cost of vehicle emissions, which inherently depend on vehicle miles traveled (VMT), fuel types as well as car characteristics (e.g., engine size, combustion system, and pollution control equipment). 1 Taken in this view, several developed countries have recently gone through green reforms on vehicle taxation. Examples include France's subsidy program, Germany's car tax reform, Japan's ecocar subsidy program, Sweden's green car rebate program, and U.S. accelerated vehicle retirement program.
Optimal coordination of the fiscal instruments is, however, complicated for a number of reasons. First, emissions from motor vehicles include not only carbon dioxides (CO 2 ), which depend only on fuel consumption, but also carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NO x ), and reactive hydrocarbons (HC), whose emissions per unit of fuel consumption may vary substantially due to vehicle characteristics. In theory, optimal vehicle taxation must reflect the negative external costs associated with vehicle choice that are not internalized by optimal fuel taxation. Because consumers choose car characteristics by partly internalizing the negative external cost of fuel consumption, the optimal amount of vehicle tax may be lower than the negative externality costs of their vehicle choice in the absence of fuel taxation (Fullerton and West, 2002) . 2 Second, automobile industries are oligopolistic industries with a small number of automakers competing in multiproduct pricing. The markup pricing tends to under-provide the goods relative to the perfectly competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, the negative externality associated with vehicle emissions implies that the market equilibrium tends to over-provide the goods relative to the social optimum. Which of the effects tends to dominate is largely an empirical question. In this context, vehicle tax reforms must take into account its effect on extensive margins. Indeed, green car tax reforms often effectively subsidize purchase of new or more fuel efficient cars, either relative to the pre-existing tax system or the efficient benchmark, which may result in a perverse entry-inducing effect (Baumol, 1988) . Such an entry-inducing effect might be potentially very large in countries where there are a large pool of potential car owners. 3 Whether such an entry-inducing effect improves efficiency depends largely on the pre-existing market conditions.
The primary objective of the present paper is, therefore, to empirically investigate the effects of vehicle taxation on vehicle emissions and social welfare, taking into account these second-best settings and the policy-induced substitution patterns. To that end, we focus on the Japanese new car market and CO 2 emissions from the lifespans of the new cars. The Japanese new car market is characterized by an oligopolistic industry with nine domestic automakers. The pre-existing taxation system consists of both a gasoline tax and a suit of vehicle taxes based on car characteristics. Most importantly, the Japanese government implemented a series of economic incentive policies on car taxes, called Ecocar Subsidy (ES) and Ecocar Tax Credits (ETC) since 2009. Their unique features created large exogenous variations in the effective prices of cars across brands and over time. Exploiting this quasi-experimental setup, we first estimate the structural parameters of the consumer demand for new passenger cars, and then use the estimated demand to simulate the policy impacts on expected annual vehicle CO 2 emissions and total economic surplus (i.e., the sum of tax revenues, industry profits, and compensating variation), relative to the no-policy counterfactual and relative to the emissions-based vehicle tax in the spirit of Fullerton and West (2002) .
There are, however, a number of empirical challenges in doing so. First, to investigate the question at hand, one would ideally like to fit the behavioral model with aggregate market-level sales data and estimate own-and cross-price elasticities for all brands. In the earlier literature (e.g., Bento et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2013; Goldberg, 1998; West, 2004) , survey-based micro data are often used to make inferences about the policy impacts. Such an approach has an obvious advantage that individual-level heterogeneity in tastes for car and driving choice can be properly accounted for. However, these survey-based studies often artificially aggregate choices into a smaller number of categories (e.g., small compact, large compact, small SUVs, large SUVs etc), as the number of observed purchases in the survey data is typically very small compared to the number of brands available in the market. This is problematic in our context, as we observe substantial variation in fuel efficiency even within car categories of similar sizes. Hence, such artificial aggregation may result in misleading inferences about the policy impacts. Second, car prices are a well-known endogenous variable for at least two reasons. There are car characteristics (e.g., brand images, style, and prestige) that consumers and firms observe but are unobservable or unquantifiable to the researchers that are likely correlated with the market prices of cars. Moreover, because individual consumers often negotiate with retailers on prices, observed sales prices such as suggested retail prices or average market prices may have measurement errors. Lastly, fitting the market-level data with conventional logit models is known to result in unrealistic or counterintuitive substitution elasticities (Nevo, 2000; 2001) .
To overcome these challenges, we employ a widely accepted random-coefficients (RC) logit model, known as the Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes (BLP) estimator. The BLP estimator was developed in Berry (1994) and Bery, Levingsohn, and Pakes (1995), and has been successfully applied in a number of empirical studies since then (e.g., BLP, 1999; Nevo, 2001; Petrin, 2002; Villas-Boas, 2007) . The method makes use of market-level data only (so does not require consumer-level data), deals with endogeneity of prices, yet allows for estimation of rich and realistic substitution patterns, which has been the problem with earlier logit models. Its main drawback, however, has been the computational burden and numerical accuracy, as it requires running a nested fixed point (NFP) algorithm as an inner-loop subroutine for the generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimation. To circumvent some of the computational problems, we take advantage of recent advances in the study of the BLP estimator (Dube et al., 2012; Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2012) .
For estimation of the model, we make use of detailed market-level data on sales by car model and quantifiable car characteristics including prices and taxes collected between 2004 and 2012. This study period includes the policy period (April, 2009 -December, 2012 , during which the Japanese government implemented a series of subsidy and tax incentive programs for low-emission, fuel-efficient cars. We make use of this quasi-experimental setup in two innovative ways. First, we take advantage of the policy-driven large variation in the effective car prices across car models and over time to obtain the consistent estimates of own-and cross-price elasticities not only among the large number of car models but also with respect to the outside option. This allows us to distinguish between the effect of inducing more consumption (called the scale effect hereafter) and the effect of inducing substitution into more ecofriendly cars (called the composition effect hereafter). Consequently, we are able to make more accurate inferences about the impacts of the policy against the counterfactuals.
Second, we exploit the exogenous changes in the tax rates as instruments to take care of the price endogeneity. Implementation of the BLP estimator requires a set of instruments for identification of parameter estimates. Earlier studies often used the 'location' of observed product characteristics in the product space as instruments, arguing that such product-location variables are at least predetermined prior to the determination of consumer demand. Though this may be a valid assumption in some contexts, there are growing concerns with the validity of the assumption. In our context, the location of observed product attributes may be highly correlated with brand images (e.g., Toyota Prius' brand image may come from its high fuel efficiency). Moreover, sales subsidiaries of the automakers tend to offer a variety of sales promotions based on productspecific sales channels. Hence, the location of product attributes may be causally correlated with the measurement errors in observed prices. Indeed, our earlier estimation runs have revealed a number of concerns with the validity of the traditional IVs. We circumvent these concerns by constructing variables that represent the location of vehicle tax rates in the characteristics space in a manner analogous to the product location variables. The vehicle taxes in Japan are indeed a function of observed product characteristics (i.e., prices, vehicle weight, and displacement size). Hence, they are correlated with prices. Yet, the frequent changes in the location of the effective tax rates over the study period are unlikely to be causally related to the unobserved product characteristics such as style and brand images, which presumably stay more or less constant over time.
We document the problems we encountered with the traditional IVs in Section 4.2 and report the results that indicate the success of our IVs in Section 6.
Our results indicate evidence for both substantial scale and composition effects of the ES/ETC policy. Though the policy successfully reduced sales-weighted average emissions, it also increased total sales substantially. Consequently, the policy-induced reduction in annual CO 2 emissions was only 0.5% relative to no policy scenario. Albeit its negligible impacts on vehicle CO 2 emissions, the ES/ETC policy was indeed welfare-enhancing because it substantially increased total economic surplus (i.e., the sum of compensating variation, industry profits, and tax revenues) relative to no such policy. 4 To further investigate the efficiency properties of vehicle taxation, we also examine the effects of an emissions-based vehicle tax (EVT) in the spirit of Fullerton and West (2002) . In first-best settings, the EVT policy should charge a tax only on the part of externality costs of vehicle characteristics that are not internalized by a complementary gasoline tax. Because motor vehicles are already heavily taxed based on vehicle weights and displacement levels, we first consider, as a benchmark, the 'EVT-rebate' policy that would offer a rebate based on fuel efficiencies car models to account for part of the external costs that are already internalized by the gasoline tax. As expected, we find that such a policy would have increased both annual vehicle CO 2 emissions and total economic surplus substantially. The estimated gradient of the EVT policy between the vehicle emissions and the total economic surplus is approximately 8,700 yen per ton of vehicle CO 2 emissions. Hence, the EVT-rebate policy would have been welfare-improving only relative to no policy if the negative external cost per ton of vehicle emissions was less (more) than 8,700 yen. Interestingly, our results also indicate that the EVT-rebate policy would have been strictly welfaredecreasing relative to the ES/ETC policy -it would result in more vehicle CO 2 emissions and less total economic surplus than the ES/ETC policy. Given this finding, we simulate the impacts of a modified version of the EVT policy based upon the ES/ETC policy (instead of the pre-existing tax system). We find that a version of the EVT-tax policy, which would add a tax (instead of a rebate) based on fuel efficiencies of car models on top of the ES/ETC policy, could have reduced vehicle CO 2 emissions substantially more, yet still increase the total surplus relative to the no policy counterfactual.
Our study complements a large body of literature that has empirically investigated the impacts of a variety of fiscal policy instruments on the demand for automobiles and vehicle miles traveled. Goldberg (1998) used the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey for [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] to examine the effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards on automobile sales, prices, and fuel consumption. She finds empirical evidence that the CAFE standards indeed worked as an implicit tax/subsidy on size of cars, effectively inducing consumers to purchase smaller cars. West (2004) used the same survey data for 1997 but investigated the distributional effects of a variety of fiscal instruments such as gasoline tax, taxes on engine size, and subsidies on new vehicles. Both studies estimated household's joint decision on vehicles and vehicle miles traveled, sequentially applying the nested logit in the first stage and the selection correction model in the second stage. Bento et al. (2009) augmented these studies' approach substantially by applying the mixed logit, imposing the cross-equation restrictions implied by Roy's identity between the two stages, and considering not only the new car market but also the used car and scrap markets. These studies rely on household-level micro data, and hence, were able to directly control for household-level idiosyncratic tastes. However, these studies do not control for the potential endogeneity of price due to unobserved product characteristics or measurement errors. Furthermore, these studies often suffer from small variation in the observed prices of the same car models over time. In contrast, ours exploits the panel structure from 36 quarters of automobile sales data and the large and persistent policy-induced variation in car taxes to control for the endogeneity of price. Furthermore, ours is probably the first attempt to empirically investigate the efficiency of the vehicle-gasoline tax system developed in Fullerton and West (2002) and Innes (1996) in second-best settings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the institutional background of the ES/ETC policies and presents the first cut of the analysis. Section 3 describes the empirical model. Section 4 discusses the estimation and identification strategy. Data and instrumental variables are described in Section 5. Our estimation results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 reports the estimated impacts of the ES/ETC and other counterfactual policies. The last section concludes.
Institutional Background
The Japanese new car market offers a unique quasi-experimental setup for our analysis. Under the Japanese taxation system, consumers face a variety of car taxes at the time of purchase as well as throughout the ownership of cars. Prior to 2009, these car taxes were only tied to the vehicle weights, displacement levels, and sales values of cars, but were not explicitly tied to the fuel efficiency or emissions performance. Consumers pay three types of taxes at the time of new car registration. First, automobile acquisition tax is a prefectural ad valorem tax, and 5% of the sales value is collected at the time of car purchase. 5 Second, vehicle weight tax is a national tax collected at the time of car inspections every 1-3 years, and was set at 12,600 yen (or 10,000 yen) per ton of vehicle weight before (or after) April of 2010. Third, annual automobile tax is a prefectural tax imposed on ownership of cars, and ranges from 29,500 to 111,000 yen for passenger cars again depending on displacement level. The last two taxes are taxes on ownership, but consumers also pay them at the time of car registration.
In 2009, the Japanese government implemented a series of policy experiments on the taxation of automobiles. The policy roughly consists of the Ecocar Tax Credits (ETC) program and the Ecocar Subsidy (ES) program. The ETC offered a variety of tax incentives based on fuel efficiency and emissions performance. For example, models exceeding the 2010 fuel efficiency standard by 15% (but less than 25%) and receiving a four-star rating on the 2005 emissions standard would receive a 50% tax cut on vehicle weight tax, a 50% tax cut on acquisition tax, and a 25% tax cut on annual automobile tax. 6 The ETC program was originally scheduled to continue until March 31, 2012 (April 30, 2012 for vehicle weight tax), but was extended (in March, 2012) to April, 2015.
The ES program, on the other hand, offered a cash rebate of 100,000 (50,000) yen for purchase of a passenger car (mini-car) if it achieves 15% above the 2010 fuel efficiency standard and the four-star rating on the 2005 emissions standard. 7 Initially, the ES program was scheduled to last until March 31, 2010. However, it was extended to September 30, 2010, as part of the 2010 economic stimulus package. Furthermore, the second phase of the ES program was re-implemented in December 20, 2011 and continued until January 31, 2013. The eligibility requirements in the second phase were made stricter than those in the first phase. The frequent policy changes and the resulting variation in eligibility and tax rates provide important exogenous variations in the effective car tax rates over time and across car models. More importantly, these ES/ETC programs allowed the car taxes to be closely linked to the carbon emissions rates of the vehicles. Figure 2 -(a) shows the scatter plots of the car taxes against the corresponding carbon emissions rates for all car models sold during the pre-policy period (January, 2004 -March, 2009 ) and during the policy period (April, 2009 -December, 2012 ). The figure illustrates that the linkage between the car taxes and the emissions performance of the cars became much tighter during the policy period than during the pre-policy period. This is also confirmed with Figure 2 -(b), which plots the kernel density of car taxes. Prior to the policies, variation in car taxes is relatively small, with the mode of the distribution around 180,000 yen. During the policy period, substantially more variation is observed, and some of the car models received negative tax rates due to the ES program.
[ Figure 2 . Regulatory Changes in Car Taxes in Japan]
The policy changes seemed to have affected both the sales and prices of new cars significantly. The average tax rate sharply dropped during the first policy subperiod. 8 It then increased slightly during the second policy subperiod due to the temporary suspension of the ecocar subsidy, and then decreased again during the third subperiod when the second phase of the ES was implemented (see Figure 3, panel b) . A casual look at the sales patterns over time suggests that these changes in tax rates appear to have induced substantial behavioral changes in terms of both aggregate consumption and substitution patterns across models. First, the share of hybrid cars in the total car sales increased dramatically during the first policy subperiod, and the trend continued throughout the policy period. 9 Second, total sales quantity (detrended by regressing it on quarter dummies) also jumped dramatically during the first policy subperiod, and then dropped sharply after the ES was ceased. The impact on the total sales is somewhat complicated, because the Japanese economy went through two substantial macroeconomic shocks during the study period (the financial crisis, known as the Lehman Shock, and the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake). 
Empirical Framework

Consumer
Our empirical framework builds upon the extensive literature on the estimation of automobile demand. In particular, we make use of the random-coefficients (RC) logit model developed in Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP, 1995).
Assume in each market t = 1, ..., T, there are I t consumers, each with i = 1, ..., I t . In this paper, a market t is defined as the market for new passenger cars in each quarter. We consider quarterly markets because all policy treatments coincide with quarter periods. Each consumer is assumed to derive utility from buying and utilizing a car. The level of utility she derives from it depends on a vector of individual characteristics η, the effective (or tax-inclusive) price of the car (1 + τ )p, and a vector of car characteristics ψ.
As in BLP, there are observable and unobservables for both the individual characteristics and the product characteristics. Let y i be the income of individual i, ν i be the unobservable characteristics of the individual that are important in the decision of which brand to buy, and i be a mean-zero stochastic term so η i = (y i , ν i , i ). The variable ν i might include things like proximity to public transportation, environmental awareness, and commuting distance that is hard to obtain even in detailed survey studies.
Let x and ξ be observable and unobservable parts of the product characteristics, so ψ = (x, ξ). We shall discuss ξ in more detail below. As discussed above, a variety of taxes and other incentives are imposed, at the consumer level, on car sales (in Japan and many other parts of the world). These tax incentives are functions of observable car characteristics, so that τ = τ (x). τ is allowed to take negative values, in which case the consumer receives a subsidy.
In each period, the consumer is assumed to buy at most one car. She can choose to buy one of the J t brands or not to buy any car ( j = 0). In the latter case, she chooses to use public transportation or continues to use a car she already owns (i.e., the outside option). Allowing for the outside option is important not only for estimation of the RC logit model, but also for estimating the environmental effect of the regulatory change. This is so particularly because we do not consider scrappage decisions explicitly as in Goldberg (1998) and BLP (1995) .
In each market t, we assume that (indirect) utility of consumer i from choosing alternative j is given by
where (α i , β i ) is a vector of "random coefficients" to be estimated and assumed to vary over individuals. 10 Following BLP (1995; 1999) and Nevo (2000; 2001) , we assume that:
vector of unobservable characteristics of individual i. The number of dimension K is equal to the number of variables in x j . Given this specification, the utility can be decomposed into the mean utility δ j , which only depends on product-specific attributes and is common to all individuals, and the idiosyncratic random utility µ i j , which depend on both product-specific attributes and individual (unobservable) attributes: 10 For notational simplicity, we suppress index t because the model is identical for all quarterly markets.
where θ 1 = (α, β) are "linear parameters" and θ 2 = are "nonlinear parameters" of the model, because θ 1 can be estimated by linear regression of δ j on product attributes whereas θ 2 need to be estimated in a nonlinear way (Nevo, 2000) . It is this nonlinear part that enables us to model richer and realistic substitution patterns, as will be discussed below. Two caveats on this specification are in order. First, we slightly diverge from BLP (1995; 1999) and exclude the nonlinear income effect as in Nevo (2000; 2001) . If we are to include the nonlinear income effect, we would either take log(y i (1 + τ j )p j ) or make α i inversely proportional to income α i = α=y i in (1). We chose this specification because our earlier attempts to estimate such a model resulted in either insignificant or positive price coefficients. Second, we also diverge from Nevo in that we do not interact the random-utility terms with observable demographic variables. We chose to do so for two reasons. First, identification of interaction parameters would require variation in the distribution of demographic variables over different markets, yet we found there was very little variation during the study period. In contrast, Nevo was able to use variation across cities as additional source of variation. Second, we had to estimate the model with a much larger number of brands (an average of 120 per market) than Nevo's study (25 brands). Thus, we concluded that little variation in the distribution of demographic variables compared with a larger number of brands would result in inefficient estimates of the parameters. Indeed, our trial runs with different sets of demographic variables resulted in non-convergence of the estimation algorithm (after days of running it for each run).
We also assume that (indirect) utility from the outside option is given by
Note that the term v i0 still needs to be included, despite that there are no observable attributes for the outside option, to account for the possibility that the idiosyncratic variance for this option may be larger than that for the "inside" goods. In other words, the term accounts for the individual-specific differences on the outside option (such as access to public transportation, used car holdings etc). Consumer i chooses alternative j if and only if
Assuming that i j are i.i.d. with a Type-I extreme value distribution, the market share of brand j is given by
where P ( ) is the population distribution of the individual attributes ν, which we assume to follow an i.i.d. standard normal per BLP (1995; 1999). 11 One important aspect of the expression is that the unobserved product attribute ξ j is not integrated out. Allowance of this term allows for a difference between the predictions of the model (based on observed attributes and estimated parameters) and the observed market shares. One way to interpret the term ξ j is that it measures the unobserved product attributes such as brand images, style, and prestige. Another way to interpret it is that it represents the measurement errors in observed market prices such as product-specific sales promotions and marketing strategies. The empirical challenge is that ξ are likely to be correlated with p -e.g., consumer demand is higher for products with better brand images, and measurement errors with respect to prices are likely 11 The integral is only with respect to ν because y i vanishes in the linear income specification.
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to be related to sales promotions and sales channels. We take the estimation strategy proposed by BLP (1995; 1999) to take care of this endogeneity, which we shall turn to in Section 4.
Producer
There are F firms in all markets and each firm produces a subset of the products J f . In each quarterly market t, the profits of firm f are given by:
where s j is the market share of brand j as defined in (4), p e is the vector of effective, tax-inclusive prices defined as p e = (1 + τ )p, mc j is the marginal cost of each brand j, M is the market size of the new car market, and FC f is the fixed cost of production.
Assuming that firms compete in the Bertrand manner and the unique pure-strategy BertrandNash equilibrium exists (as in BLP, 1995 , 1999 and Nevo, 2000 , 2001 , the price of each brand j satisfies the following first-order condition:
For each market, this set of J equations determines the optimal markup for each brand. These markups can be solved explicitly a la Nevo (2001) . Let us define the matrix such that each element of is defined as jk = O jk D jk , where O jk is the matrix describing the ownership structure:
and D jk is the matrix of share derivatives with respect to prices, multiplied by 1:
Then the first-order condition implies:
where s e is a vector of market shares adjusted for tax rates: i.e., the j-th element of s e is s e j = s j =(1 + τ j ).
Once we obtain the consistent estimates of demand parameters, we can estimate the price-cost margins or the marginal costs using (5), which can then be used to simulate the policy-induced effects on industry profits. This strategy was taken in Nevo (2001) . One could impose further structures on the supply relationship, and the cost parameters could then be jointly estimated with the demand parameters. For example, BLP (1995; 1999) specify the marginal costs as functions of cost shifters such as observed product attributes, wages, and unobservable product attributes. Such a strategy would improve the efficiency of the estimates, but at the cost of imposing more structures and increasing computational burden. As we do not directly make use of the cost side parameters in our simulation analysis, we shall take Nevo's approach to avoid undue complexity.
Empirical Strategy
Estimation
For estimation of the model, we closely follow the methods proposed in BLP (1995) and its detailed explanation offered in Nevo (2000) . Suppose we have data on a set of exogenous instruments z such that the unobserved product attributes are mean independent of z:
This gives us a set of population moment restrictions. Then the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimates of the parameters is:
where is a consistent estimate of E[z 0 ξξ 0 z], which is used to weight moments in accordance to their variance. A question remains as to how we might obtain ξ, which by assumption is unobservable to researchers. A key here is to recognize that ξ j can be considered as an unobservable error in the mean utility δ j in (3). In the simple logit model, ξ j could be estimated by simply regressing
In our case, however, s j is given by (4) and is a nonlinear function of the (x j , p j ). BLP (1995) proposed a nested fixed point (NFP) algorithm to numerically solve for ξ. Let S j be the observed market share of brand j and s j be the market share function defined by Eq. (4). Then the value of the mean utility term δ can be solved numerically by the contraction mapping: 12
Once the convergence is achieved and the estimate ofδ so obtained, the estimate of the unobservable product attribute can be easily computed by:
Thus in essence, the estimation is done by repetition of the two-step procedure. First, given the initial guess of the parametersθ 0 , run the NFP algorithm to get the estimate ofδ 0 and obtain the estimate of the errorξ 0 (this is the "inner loop" of the estimation). Second, solve the optimization program (7) to get the estimate ofθ. We repeat the process until the optimization routine achieves desired tolerance. Our estimation is done by carefully modifying the Matlab code supplied at Nevo's website. 13 Recently, however, studies have found important problems with implementation of the NFP algorithm and the resulting estimates (see Dube et al. (2012) and Knittel and Metaxoglou (2012) for a more detailed review of such issues). In particular, Dube et al. showed that use of loose tolerance criteria for the inner-loop algorithm to ease the computational burden may result in (i) failure of the optimization program to converge or (ii) the optimization finding parameter estimates that are not even local optima. Indeed, our earlier attempt to directly use Nevo's code revealed both of these problems. To overcome these problems, we adjusted Nevo's original code and used innerloop tolerance of 1E-14 as suggested by Dube et al. We also replaced Matlab's optimization routine "fminu" with Zeina's KNITRO program, which is substantially more robust and efficient than "fminu". Dube et al. also suggested an alternative algorithm known as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We also tested this method and found the estimates were similar.
Identification and Instrumental Variables
The key to the estimation of the model is a set of instrumental variables required for the moment condition in (6) . The common identifying assumption, used in BLP (1995; 1999) and subsequent studies, is that the 'location' of observed product attributes for each brand in the characteristics space is exogenous, or at least predetermined prior to the determination of consumer's valuation of unobserved brand-specific attributes. More specifically, BLP used the observed product characteristics, the values of the characteristics summed over all brands produced by each firm, and the values of the characteristics summed over all brands produced by other firms. Because firms' marginal costs are likely to correlate with their own product characteristics, and because their price markups depend on their product characteristics relative to their competitors, these product-location variables are also likely to correlate with prices. On the other hand, because the product-location variables are at least predetermined at the time of consumers' decisions, they may not be causally related to the unobservable product attributes such as style, prestige, and reputation. This approach has been successfully applied in BLP (1995; 1999) and other subsequent studies.
In our case, however, this common identifying assumption may not be truly valid. For example, Toyota's well-know compact-car/hybrid-car strategies suggest that the location of observed attributes such as size and fuel efficiency for their most-selling brands such as Vitz (known as Yaris in U.S. and Europe) and Prius may be highly correlated with unobserved brand images consumers have about these products. In addition, in Japan, some brands are sold exclusively through certain sales channels. For example, Toyota Camry and Vitz, two flagship models, are sold only through stores under the franchises of the Corolla and the Netz, respectively. Because we only observe regular market prices, ξ can also include brand-specific or franchise-specific sales promotions or marketing champaigns, information on which is not readily available to us. Some of the location variables, such as those for size and fuel efficiency, may then be causally related to these unobservable sales promotions. Indeed, our earlier attempt to estimate the RC logit with the traditional IVs resulted in both very large GMM objective values and the estimates of price coefficients that are highly sensitive to the random draws ν.
Given the above concerns, we consider an alternative set of instruments, exploiting the unique quasi-experimental setup in the Japanese new car market. As discussed in Section 2, the series of green tax policies generated exogenous variations in tax rates across brands and over time. Because these tax rates are functions of the observable product characteristics (price, weight, and displacement level), they would surely be correlated with prices. On the other hand, the ES/ETC policy caused the effective tax rates to change three times over the study period, which shifted the location of the tax rates in the characteristics space, while the unobserved product characteristics such as style and brand images presumably stayed largely constant. Hence, our tax-location variables are unlikely to be causally related to the unobserved characteristics. Some may argue that though these tax rates are not explicitly chosen by automakers or by consumers, automakers may have influenced the design of the policy in favor of some particular brands (e.g., hybrid cars). Even so, the frequent changes should minimize that causal link between the unobservable attributes and the tax rates. Therefore, our tax-location IVs would be a better instrument, if not perfect, than the traditional IVs. To operationalize this idea, we construct the tax-location variables in a manner analogous to BLP: i.e., the sums of own-firm tax rates/amounts and the sums of rival-firm tax rates/amounts.
One may argue (correctly) that if we believe ξ represents unquantifiable brand images or measurement errors in observed prices, simply including brand fixed effects in the set of covariates x might just take care of the concern. The problem with this approach is that if we include brand dummies in the regression, the matrix of z 0 z will be essentially singular, as they do not vary across brands and over time. Hence it cannot be inverted. An alternative would be to not use the brand dummies in the regression but use them as IVs. We then, however, encounter the same problem -brand dummies could be plausibly correlated with ξ. See Nevo (2001) for more detailed discussions on this and related issues.
Data
Our data analysis covers the period from January, 2004 to December, 2012. We obtained the data on product characteristics and listed prices for all the domestic passenger car models marketed during this period from Carsensor.Net, one of the largest used car retailer in Japan. 14 To make our analysis comparable to previous studies, we consider the following major product attributes: the ratio of horsepower to car weight (HP/weight), mileage per yen (MPY), car size (Size), and a dummy indicating whether the model has automatic transmission (AT). 15 Information on fuel efficiency and displacement was also used to determine the ES and ETC eligibility and to calculate MPY, which is the mileage per liter of gasoline divided by the price of gasoline per liter. We treat the same model produced in different time periods as different models: i.e., Honda Accord 2009 versus Honda Accord 2010, as they could be very different due to the rapid technological upgrading. W use the retail sales prices obtained from Carsensor.Net and deflate them by the consumer price index.
The monthly sales data are obtained from Japan Automobile Dealers Association (JADA). Since we have only the total sales for each model and, in many cases, there are many variants (or 'grades') of each model, we obtain the corresponding product attributes and prices by taking the averages over all the variants of the same model marketed in the same time period. We confirmed the validity of this treatment in two ways. First, we were able to obtain detailed used-car sales data by grade for a small fraction of the car models. We used the data to verify that the majority of sales are concentrated around the variant of the model that has close proximity to the mean attributes. Second, we estimated the IV logit model using the maximum, minimum and median as alternatives, and our major results are quite robust to the different choices.
Besides the data mentioned above, we also make use of some macroeconomic data, such as GDP growth rate, CPI, total number of households, and gasoline prices, which were collected from various sources. The GDP and CPI data are taken from the statistics published by the Cabinet Office of the Japanese government. The data on the number of households are based on the estimates from the Institute of Population and Social Security. The monthly prices of gasoline are from the Institute of Energy Economics in Japan. Table 2 shows the trends in the sales, prices and major product attribute variables used in our analysis over the study period. The prices and major product attributes are sales-weighted means. Note that the drop in the share of the cars with AT from the first quarter to the second quarter in 2009 was 7.2%, much larger than other time periods, which also coincides with the timing of the policies of interest. This may reflect the increase in the non-AT fuel efficient cars, such as hybrid cars. 16 Table 3 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the hybrid cars only. It is evident that the sales of hybrid cars have been increasing rapidly, especially after the first quarter of 2009. It took five years for the market share of the hybrid cars to triple from 2004 to 2008, while it went six times larger from 0.052 in 2009 to 0.318 in 2012. The prices of hybrid cars are generally higher than the average car prices. During the period 2005-2008, hybrid car prices rose quickly probably because of the increasing demand due to the high prices of gasoline. Compared to nonhybrid cars, hybrid cars tend to have lower ratio of horsepower to weight and larger size, but much higher fuel efficiency. The reason why MPY was relatively higher in 2004 is because only a couple of highly fuel efficient hybrid car models (e.g., Toyota Prius, Honda Civic Hybrid and Honda Insight) were available in the Japanese new car market then. Hybrid cars usually use CVT or manual transmission systems, but automatic transmission was also used in some models (i.e., Nissan Fuga 2011) after 2010.
One take-away message from Tables 2 and 3 is that the trends in the key product characteristics did not change dramatically by the introduction of green car tax policies, yet the increase in the variety and market share of the hybrid cars appear to have increased during the policy period.
[ Table 3 . Sales, Price and Product Characteristics of Hybrid Cars over Time]
Results
Logit Results
We first report the results from the OLS and IV Logit models in Table 4 . They give us a sense of the performance of different sets of instrumental variables for the full RC logit model, though these models are known to yield unrealistic substitution patterns (see Nevo, 2001 for a thorough discussion on this point). Note that in the logit models, the stochastic error term includes the unobserved product attribute ξ j (so does the random utility term µ i j ). Therefore, the overidentification tests would likely reject the null hypothesis if the set of instruments are correlated with any of these terms.
The results are obtained from regressing ln(S jt ) ln(S 0t ) on constants, effective prices, HP/weight, MPY, size, auto transmissions, year dummies, quarter dummies, and maker dummies, with and without the macroeconomic variable (seasonally adjusted GDP growth rates) to account for the effects of the financial crisis and the Tohoku earthquake. 17 The first two columns in Table 4 report the results from OLS logit, with and without the macroeconomic variables. Columns (III)-(V) display the results of IV logit with different sets of instruments, without the macroeconomic variable. Columns (VI)-(VIII) report the same, but with the macroeconomic variable.
We include quarter fixed effects, because in Japan at least, the car sales has large seasonal effects, particularly in the first quarter and the third quarter (see our discussion in Section 5). This occurs because these correspond to the two bonus seasons and the Japanese automakers put together sales promotions in response. As discussed above, including brand fixed effects in the regression is problematic. We thus instead included maker fixed effects to control for makerspecific brand values (Nevo, 2001 ).
[Table 4. Estimation Results: OLS Logit and IV Logit]
For all models, coefficients on MPY and auto transmissions are significant, with signs consistent with our expectation. With the OLS logit, the coefficients on prices are negative and significant. With the traditional 'product-location' IVs, however, coefficients on price and size turn insignificant, whereas with our 'tax-location' IVs, they become significant again. HP/weight is not significant with virtually all models, but this result is indeed consistent with BLP (1995). Importantly, when the 'product-location' IVs are used, the overidentification test rejects the null, suggesting that some of the IVs are endogenous. When the 'tax-location' IVs are used instead, the overidentification test cannot reject the null at the 0.2 significant level with model (VII). We take this as evidence that our 'tax-location' IVs are more reliable than the conventional 'productlocation' IVs for our full model. We also examine the weak IV problem. Though not reported, all the tax-location IVs are significant at the 1% level in the first stage regression, and the F-statistic for the explanatory power of these variables is 214.85, much higher than the conventional cutoff of 10, suggesting that our IVs are unlikely to suffer from the weak IV problem.
Results of the Full RC Logit Model
We now report the results of the full RC logit model, with two alternative sets of IVs. For both IVs, we include the same set of variables as model (VII): constants, effective prices, HP/weight, MPY, size, auto transmissions, GDP growth rate, year-quarter fixed effects, and maker fixed effects. Column (IX) reports the result with the traditional 'product-location' IVs whereas column (X) displays the result with our 'tax-location' IVs. As discussed in Section 5, we used inner-loop tolerance for NFP = 1E-14 and outer-loop tolerance for GMM = 1E-3.
First, the value of the GMM objective is substantially lower with our 'tax-location' IVs than with the traditional IVs. Our GMM objective value is small even compared to the average GMM objective values (178-278, depending on the estimation algorithms used) reported by Knittel and Metaxoglou (2012) , who re-estimated the RC model nearly identical to ours using BLP's original auto data. Thus the value of 15.8 appears to substantiate the success of our 'tax-location' IVs.
In interpreting the results in Table 5 , note that there are in general two ways to explain the effect of each product characteristic. For example, a large-sized car might be popular, either because an average consumer places a high value for the large-sized car (i.e., the effect of the mean utility) or because there is a large variance in consumers' tastes for the large-sized car (i.e., the effect of the distribution of the random utility). 18 Thus the significance on mean parameters would get at the significance of the former effects whereas that on standard deviation parameters would get at the latter. If we expect any of these variables has significant influence on purchase decision, we should observe at least one of these on each variable is significant.
With the traditional IVs, we observe that all of the mean parameters of the variables (except on AT) are significant at the conventional significance levels, but with signs inconsistent with our expectation. Moreover, virtually all of the standard deviation parameters are insignificant. Another reason why we think the traditional IVs do not perform well in our context is because the estimated parameters appeared to be highly sensitive to both the size and seed of random draws v, the problem we did not encounter with our preferred IVs.
With our preferred IVs, the results are more encouraging. All of the mean parameters are significant at the conventional significance levels with signs in line with our expectation, suggesting that consumers, on average, prefer more HP/weight, MPY, and size and dislike higher prices and AT. Not only that, the standard deviation parameters on price and HP/weight are significant, suggesting that there are large variations in the tastes for these characteristics. In some urban areas in Japan, public roads are notoriously narrow so that some consumers may prefer smaller or less powerful cars. On the other hand, in rural areas, others may prefer larger and more powerful cars for daily operations. The standard deviation parameters on MPY, size, and auto transmissions are insignificant, suggesting that variance in the tastes for these attributes is small.
[ Table 5 . Estimation Results: Full Random-Coefficients Logit]
One well-documented advantage of the RC logit model over simpler logit models is that it gives richer and more realistic own-and cross-price elasticities of demand (Nevo, 2000; 2001) . With the simple logit models, own-and cross-price elasticities depend only on the constant parameter, own and cross prices, and observed market shares, which result in (i) nearly constant own-price elasticities and (ii) counter-intuitive substitution patterns that do not take into account similarities between brands. With the RC logit, the own-and cross-price elasticities are instead give by:
where s i j is the choice probability for brand j by individual i. In this expression, each individual has a different price elasticities, which are averaged out to yield mean elasticities. Table 6 displays the sales and product characteristics of the 15 top selling brands as well as the estimated elasticities based on our preferred model (X) for 2011. As expected, many of the brands in the table have inelastic demand with respect to own prices because these are top-selling brands with strong brand identities. Though not reported, a vast majority of other brands had much larger own-price elasticities. The weighted average own-price elasticity for all brands in 2011 was -1.7, which is roughly comparable to the reported elasticities in BLP (1995), which range from -3 to -4.5, and in Bento et al. (2009) , which range from -0.88 to -1.97. Toyota Corolla and Nissan Serena have the largest own-price elasticities among these brands presumably because these brands are much older than others.
The estimated model also allows us to estimate the substitutability of the inside goods to the outside option. We make explicit use of the substitution elasticities to the outside option in identifying the scale effect of the ES/ETS policy. Given an appropriate measure of market size M (with all relevant brands in the data), we examine how the total sales quantity M(1 s 0 ) would respond to a counterfactual policy scenario. Hence, it is crucial to obtain consistent estimates of the substitution elasticities. The last column of Table 6 reports, à la BLP (1995), the estimated percentage of consumers who substitute to the outside good as a percentage of those who substitute away from a brand, given a price increase for that brand, for top-selling brands in 2011: i.e., ds 0 =dp j jds j =dp j j 100.
The number essentially indicates, given a small price increase for the brand j, of those who decided not to purchase the brand, what percentage of them would choose not to buy any of the brands. As in BLP (1995), the estimated substitution elasticities vary substantially across brands. We emphasize here that these numbers are roughly comparable to those in BLP (1995), yet are smaller than those in BLP (1995). We deem as evidence of our success in estimation -BLP (1995) note their numbers "still seem a bit large" (p.881). Table 7 reports the estimated average own-and cross-price elasticities for these brands for 2011. Each entry ( j, k) represents a percentage change of the market share for brand j with respect to a percentage change of the price of brand k. The estimated elasticities exhibit expected signs and magnitudes and are roughly comparable with those reported in BLP (1995) on U.S. counterparts. There is also substantial variation across brands, unlike with the standard logit model, which would display the identical elasticity for all entries in each column. 19 [ Many of the top-selling brands in the table had small or negligible cross-price elasticities, the 19 Note that with the standard logit, the cross-price elasticity formula is ε jk = α p k s k for all j 6 = k, instead of Eq. (8).
magnitudes of which are roughly comparable to those reported in BLP (1995) . 20 Yet, some of the top-selling brands had relatively large cross-price elasticities with respect to each other, particularly to brands with similar characteristics. For example, Corolla, Toyota's long-selling compact car, had relatively large elasticities with respect to the prices of Toyota's other compact cars, Vitz and Ractis. Note that these cross-price elasticities are highly asymmetric for some of the brands. For example, the demand for Toyota Prius is relatively sensitive to the price of Toyota Corolla, yet the demand for Corolla is not sensitive to the price of Prius. Interestingly, Honda Fit and Honda Fit Hybrid have negligible cross-price elasticities with each other, suggesting that they are not perceived as close substitutes despite the fact that the latter is simply a hybrid version of the same brand. This makes sense because these two models indeed have very different product attributes (see Table 6 ). Lastly, the estimated cross-price elasticities also seem to point to important sales or marketing channels. Though not reported in the table, Toyota Wish (a popular minivan, which comes at 16th in the sales ranking) has a cross-price elasticity of 0.09 with respect to the price of Toyota Vitz (a compact car). Though the two brands may appear to have no apparent similarities, both are sold exclusively in one of Toyota's sales channel "Netz" (with the original Logo "N"), and are popular among younger families. On the other hand, Toyota Vitz has a larger cross-price elasticity of 0.42 with respect to the price of Wish, which also makes sense because Wish's retail price is much higher (average at JPY1.9 million) than that of Vitz (average at JPY1.35 million).
[ Table 7 . Estimated Own-and Cross-Price Elasticities of the Top 15 Sales Brands for Year 2011]
Policy Evaluation
Our primary interest lies in translating these policy-induced demand responses into aggregate vehicle CO 2 emissions and social welfare. To that end, we consider three counterfactual scenarios. The first scenario assumes that the Japanese government implements no ES/ETC policy. The second scenario assumes that only the ETC program is implemented. In the third scenario, we examine the effect of an emissions-based vehicle tax (EVT) à la Fullerton and West (2002) . To operationalize the idea of the EVT, we consider the following rebate/tax system, based on some reference tax and fuel efficiencies of cars:
where τ m jt is the amount of car tax under some reference tax system m for brand j in period t, MPG jt is miles per gallon, and A is some constant that defines the tax/rebate rate per unit of fuel efficiency. As a benchmark, we consider m = the pre-existing tax system and A = 200. 21 We also examine the case of m = the ES/ETC policy and varying A, a rational for which is discussed below.
There are several advantages of formalizing the EVT this way. First, as shown in Appendix, this formulation closely follows the optimal vehicle tax in the spirit of Fullerton and West (2002) , provided that an efficient gasoline tax is in place and there is no imperfect competition. With such 20 In BLP (1995), even the brands that had the largest own-and cross-price elasticities exhibited cross-price elasticities that were in the order of 1/100 or smaller relative to their respective own-price elasticities. 21 This value of A corresponds to the following values in eq. (A2) in Appendix: V MT = 10, 575 km, ∑ L l=1 λ l EPM l (x) = 50, 000 yen, and ∑
K k=1
∂MPG(x) dx kx k jt using estimated coefficients from the regression ln(MPG) = xβ.
an interpretation, A < 0 and the second component can be considered a rebate on choosing fuelefficient cars for part of the external costs that is already internalized by a gasoline tax. Second, depending on the sign of A, this works as either a tax or a subsidy on fuel efficiency. For example, the expected annual CO 2 emissions from a car j in period t can be approximated by (EPG V MT)=MPG jt (see the discussion below). Then, we can interpret A > 0 as a vehicle carbon tax based on the expected vehicle CO 2 emissions. Third, because of other pre-existing distortions, the optimal EVT à la Fullerton and West (2002) may not be necessarily welfare-improving. Indeed, whether a rebate (A < 0) or a tax (A < 0) would work better is an empirical question. This formulation allows us to conveniently evaluate the effect of varying A from negative to positive values. Because the ETC/ES policies were implemented after April, 2009 (except for auto tax cuts prior to that), we shall focus on the policy impacts after 2009. For each policy scenario, we simulate the consumption patters based on the estimated demand model, and estimate the changes in aggregate CO 2 emissions, compensating variation, industry profits, and tax revenues relative to the no-policy counterfactual, which would simulate the pre-existing market condition.
For aggregate CO 2 emissions, we adopt the following measure of (expected) aggregate emissions, in a manner analogous in spirit to Fullerton and Gan (2005) and Klier and Linn (2011) . Let E t be the aggregate CO 2 emissions generated via the consumption of gasoline in utilizing the cars purchased in each market t. Then, E t can be approximated by:
where for each market t in each quarter, q jt is the sales quantity of car model j, MPG jt is the miles per gallon of gasoline for car model j, V MT jt is the vehicle miles traveled for model j, and EPG jt is the average CO 2 emissions per gallon of gasoline used in driving for model j.
As in the previous literature (e.g., Innes, 1996), we assume EPG jt = EPG and use the EPA estimate of 8.887 kilograms per gallon (EPA, 2011). The problem, however, is that unlike in the U.S. or elsewhere, there is no publicly available household survey data to correctly account for driving distance, which may vary either by consumer or by car model or both. Ideally, we would conduct a household survey to jointly estimate the car ownership and car utilization decisions in a manner analogous to Bento et al. (2009) . Due to the data limitation, we assume V MT i jt = V MT and use the average annual driving distance per person of 10,575 km in Japan (MLITT, 2012). Then, the expected aggregate CO 2 emissions from the new cars sold can be approximated by:
where ϕ jt = (EPG V MT)=MPG jt . This measure essentially asks, "How much of CO 2 emissions would be emitted from the cars sold during each period t if all consumers drive the same distance V MT?" Though this is not an ideal measure, it is not a bad approximation for the impact of the policy on CO 2 emissions, provided that no reliable estimates exist on the driving distance of every car sold during each period in Japan. 22 Albeit its limitation, one advantage of the approximation (10) is that the impact of a policy change can be decomposed into two components:
where Q m t = ∑ j q m jt is the total sales quantity andφ m t = ∑ j s m jt ϕ m jt is the weighted average emissions under policy m in quarterly market t, with weight = sales share s m jt for each j. The first term is the scale effect, which measures the impact purely of the total sales quantity holding the average emissions rate constant. The second term is the composition effect, which measures the impact of changes in the composition of the total sales.
Making inferences about the policy impacts also requires us to obtain the standard errors of the estimated impacts. Doing so in our context is not easy. We could linearize the policy impacts in the parameters and use the "delta method." However, as the policy impacts are highly nonlinear in the parameters, this approach may not be appropriate. Berry et al. (1999) instead use a Monte Carlo approach, taking draws from the estimated asymptotic normal distribution of the parameters. We took 300 draws of parameters, and calculate the standard deviations of the policy impacts as the estimates of the standard errors.
We first report in Table 8 the estimated aggregate emissions under each policy scenario. We make several important observations. First, the estimated annual reduction in gasoline-consumptionrelated CO 2 emissions from the ETC/ES policy is 26,900 tons or only 0.5% of the annual emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the policy. Second, using Eq. (11), we can decompose the impacts into the scale and composition effects. We see that the policy indeed had substantial effects of both. The ETC/ES policy induced consumers into buying more fuel efficient cars. This substitution alone is estimated to have reduced 157,000 tons of CO 2 emissions or roughly 2.7%. However, this reduction is largely offset by the scale effect, which increased the total sales of cars by giving incentives for buying cars. The scale effect is estimated to have increased 130,100 tons of CO 2 emissions annually or roughly 2.3% relative to no policy. Third, a somewhat more encouraging observation is that the Japanese government's decision to add the ES policy on top of the ETC policy seemed to have induced a further reduction in aggregate emissions, rather than increasing it (Compare column 6 and column 8). Fourth, the EVT policy with a rebate on part of the external costs that are already internalized by the gasoline tax (the EVT-rebate policy henceforth) would have increased aggregate emissions by a large margin (9.2% relative to no policy), with the scale effect accounting for about 63% of the annual CO 2 increase.
[ Table 8 . Decomposition of the Simulated Impacts on Expected Aggregate Emissions from the New Car Sales]
We now evaluate the impacts on social welfare. Table 9 report the simulated impacts of three policy scenarios on aggregate vehicle CO 2 emissions, compensating variation, industry profits for domestic automakers, and tax revenues. The compensating variation does not include the negative externality cost of vehicle emissions, and is estimated using a standard formula (see Knittel and Metaxoglou, 2012) . In this sense, in our calculation of total economic surplus, we only include consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tax revenues, and does not include the negative externality costs of vehicle CO 2 emissions. We do this because the estimates of the marginal economic damages associated with CO 2 emissions vary substantially across studies due to scientific uncertainty.
As expected, the ES/ETC policy had a positive impact on both consumer welfare and industry profits, with increases of 175.8 billion yen and 106.8 billion yen annually relative to no policy. The increase in industry profits and consumer welfare more than offset the decrease in tax revenues. Because it also induced a reduction in vehicle CO 2 emissions, the ES/ETC policy was indeed welfare-improving. The net effects of the ES program on top of the ETC program are estimated at about -40.1, 33.8, and 29.2 billion yen, respectively, for compensating variation, industry profits, and tax revenues. Hence, the net gain in total economic surplus, excluding that from environmental damages, is positive and estimated to be 22.8 billion yen annually. Hence, the Japanese government decision to subsidy ecofriendly cars was also welfare-improving. 23 By contrast, the EVT-rebate policy, with A = 200 in eq. (9), was also estimated to increase total economic surplus by 46.2 billion yen annually. However, the increase in total surplus is small because the rebate policy decreases tax revenues substantially. Because the policy would increase vehicle CO 2 emissions substantially, the pure EVT-rebate policy would not have been welfare-enhancing unless the negative externality damage per ton of CO 2 is 8,700 yen or lower. 24 [ We now investigates the economic impacts of varying levels of A, from a rebate (A < 0) to a tax (A > 0) on fuel inefficiency, using two reference tax systems: m = 0 (the pre-existing tax system) and m = the ES/ETC policy in (9) . Figure 4 reports the changes in annual vehicle CO 2 emissions and total economic surplus.
The figure demonstrates that there is a clear trade-off between total surplus and vehicle emissions. With either reference system, an EVT-rebate policy would generally increase total surplus at the cost of also increasing vehicle emissions. An EVT-tax policy would generally have the opposite effects. As expected, however, the total surplus (excluding environmental damages) has a concave relationship to aggregate vehicle emissions. Aggregate vehicle emissions is monotonically decreasing in A, whereas there is a tradeoff between tax revenues and the sum of consumer welfare and industry profits. The figure demonstrates the two unique features of Japan's ES/ETC policy. First, unlike the EVT policy, the ES/ETC policy does not exhibit a simple tradeoff between the total surplus and the vehicle emissions. As a result, the policy outcome (the triangle marker) is far off any points along the EVT curve (the + marker). Second, the ES/ETC policy increased the total surplus with only a small change in vehicle emissions. This occurs presumably because tax rate reductions were varied not only by fuel efficiency but also by other product characteristics (i.e., they vary by sales prices, weights, and displacement levels). Indeed, with the ES/ETC policy as the reference tax system in (9), we see that it is possible to reduce vehicle CO 2 emissions substantially while also increasing total economic surplus relative to the pre-existing equilibrium. The result of the exercise is illustrated by the dot plot, which demonstrates that this version of the EVT policy exhibits the analogous tradeoff between vehicle emissions and total surplus, yet the trajectory lies strictly above that for the case of m = the pre-existing tax system. These results suggest that tailoring vehicle taxes for all relevant dimensions may be the key to improving efficiency.
[ 
Concluding Remarks
Using detailed quarterly automobile sales data in Japan between 2004 and 2012, the randomcoefficients logit model known as the BLP estimator was estimated. The estimated own-and cross-price elasticities of demand were then used to make inferences about the effects of the ETC and ES programs on aggregate vehicle CO 2 emissions and social welfare. We exploited the unique quasi-experimental setup created through a series of green car tax policies in the Japanese new car market in two ways. First, we took advantage of the large and persistent variation in the effective prices of cars that varied across models and over time in identifying the price elasticities. The estimated elasticities were then used to (i) simulate the counterfactual policies and (ii) decompose the scale and composition effects of the policies. Second, we constructed a new set of instrumental variables, arguing that the location of the tax rates over the product space is exogenous.
The results were much satisfying. The IVs seemed to work much better than the traditional product-location IVs. We found evidence of both strong scale and composition effects. The ES/ETC policy successfully shifted consumption toward fuel-efficient, ecofriendly cars, resulting in a large decline in the sales-weighted average emissions per vehicle (the composition effect). Yet, the policy also induced a higher level consumption of cars (the scale effect), which had largely offset the composition effect. As a result, the overall reduction in CO 2 emissions due to the policies was small. An alternative emissions-based vehicle tax would have reduced aggregate emissions substantially more. However, despite their negligible impacts on vehicle emissions, the ES/ETC policy was found to be substantially welfare-increasing, relative to both the no policy scenario, precisely due to the pre-existing market distortions. Most importantly, a version of the emissionsbased vehicle tax would strictly improve social welfare, relative to both the no policy scenario and the ES/ETC policy scenario.
While our study offers several advantages over the previous studies, it also has several important limitations. Addressing them would define new and important agendas for future research. First, due to data limitation, we did not estimate the car ownership and utilization decisions jointly. Recent studies have shown that (i) combining the market-level data with householdlevel data (BLP, 2004; Petrin, 2004) and (ii) imposing cross-equation restrictions by imposing the Roy's identify for the demand for car utilization (Bento et al., 2009 ) would improve the consistency and efficiency of the estimates. Second, we did not investigate the effects of the ES/ETC policy on used car and scrap markets. In theory, the policy must have had two counteracting effects. On one hand, the policy would induce consumers into buying new, fuel-efficient cars and, therefore, may facilitate retirement of old, fuel-inefficient cars. 25 On the other hand, the policy would also induce consumers into buying used cars because it would increase the supply of used cars, thereby decreasing the prices of used cars. Hence, it seems largely an empirical question whether inclusion of used car and scrap markets would increase or decrease the estimated impacts on aggregate emissions. Hence, collecting detailed household-level data on car ownership and utilization as well as detailed used car sales/scrap data and combining them with ours would further improve the accuracy of the estimated impacts of the green car tax reforms.
Appendix. Theoretical Underpinnings for the Emissions-based Vehicle Tax Policy
Consider the optimal combination of vehicle and gasoline taxes that would replicate the social optimum in the absence of imperfect competition. Fullerton and West (2002) show that given the efficient gasoline tax, the optimal vehicle tax rate for product attribute k for pollutant l is:
where λ l is the negative external damage per unit of emissions, EPM l is emissions per mile of driving, and MPG is milage per gallon of gasoline. As Fullerton and West (2002) note, the first term in the bracket times λ l V MT represents the environmental damage due to a per-unit increase of attribute k, and is positive for most product attributes (e.g., weight, size, and displacement). On the other hand, the second term in the bracket is often negative for most attributes because ∂MPG=∂x k < 0. This term is a 'rebate' for part of the external cost that is already internalized by the gasoline tax. Moreover, note that the expression inside the bracket can be rewritten as ∂EPG l =∂x k , where EPG l stands for emissions per gallon of gasoline. This means that there is no need for a separate vehicle tax if we care only about CO 2 emissions because ∂EPG CO 2 =∂x k = 0.
Summing over (A1) for all k and l, and evaluating it at the means of the product attributes, we obtain the amount of tax for an automobile with characteristics x jt :
wherex indicates a vector of the means of the attributes. Note that the first term represents the (sum of) environmental damages from buying a car with attributes x jt . The second term is the rebate for buying a car with fuel efficiency MPG(x jt ) that is already internalized by the gasoline tax. If we had product-specific emissions data for CO, HC, and NO x , we would be able to estimate ∂EPM l =∂x k for each attribute k and replicate this tax perfectly. Unfortunately, we only have data on MPG(x jt ). Under the pre-existing Japanese vehicle taxation, tax rates vary by vehicle weight and displacement because emissions per unit of fuel for CO, HC, and NO x increase with these product attributes. Hence, the tax system may be already incorporating the first component. On the other hand, tax rates do not vary by fuel efficiency under the pre-existing tax system, and hence, it does not incorporate the second rebate component. Based on this observation, we approximate T EVT (x jt ) as follows:
where τ m jt represent taxes under some benchmark taxation m and we evaluate A(λ) at the means of the attributes, and therefore, is constant:
Indeed, the ES/ETC policy partly uses this idea because it gives subsidies and tax credits based on fuel efficiency. . Note: A hybrid version of the same car brand is treated as a separate brand, so the sales and other product characteristics exclude those of the hybrid model. Price = average retail price in 10,000 JPY; HP/Weight = HP/weight in kw/kg; MPY = mileage in km per JPY; Size = the sum of length, width and height; AT = the fraction of the car grades that have automatic transmission; Outside substitution = estimated percentage of consumers who substitute to the outside good as a percentage of those who substitute away from the good, given a price increase of the good. All quantities are simple averages, except for sales, which is the sum of sales for 2011. Changes to tax revenues (relative to no policy) due to:
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